It’s a fundamental rule in Virginia that the Plaintiff (the person filing a lawsuit) can only recover the relief requested in the Complaint. In a recent unpublished decision, the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirement that a party can only get relief if they ask for it.

Continue reading “In litigation, you can’t always get what you want (especially if you don’t ask)”

Virginia’s new codified Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 2012. In an article in Virginia Lawyers Weekly, five of the rules were highlighted. One of those highlighted rules was Rule 2:408, “Compromise and Offers to Compromise.” The terms of this rule differ from the terms of the Federal Rule of Evidence 408, but those differences will not be explored in this post. Instead, this blog post will review Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:408, and its possible implications for settlement discussions and mediation.

Continue reading “Do the Virginia Rules of Evidence change settlement negotiations and mediations?”

We continually warn about the use of work email accounts to correspond with your attorney:

• 3 tips for safe emailing with your attorney;
• Using a company computer to email your attorney may be a bad idea
• Emails from work computer can waive rights to privileged communications

The American Bar Association has now opined that lawyers should “warn the client about the risk of sending or receiving electronic communications using a computer or other device, or e-mail account, where there is a significant risk that a third party may gain access.” Although the ABA’s opinion is not binding upon any state regulatory bar association, it is likely that state bar associations, like the Virginia State Bar, will review this opinion with interest.

Client Email

Most of our communications are not private, even though we think they are. Work emails are not secure. Regardless of whether lawyers are required or suggested to warn clients, it is not a good idea to use your work email account to email your attorney.

Tarley Robinson, PLC, Attorneys and Counsellors at Law

Williamsburg, Virginia

Readers of our website may notice that we list “Estate Administration” as an area of our practice. We assist executors of wills, or personal representatives of estates to properly dispose of a decedent’s assets.

Occasionally, we get involved in cases in which a party contests a decedent’s Will that has been probated with the court. Typically, that person will claim that another Will should be considered the proper Will because the most recent Will was either

• made when the decedent lacked the mental capacity at the time the Will was made, or
• the most recent Will was made under the undue influence by a person who held a position of trust and confidence with the decedent.

In the case of Weedon v. Weedon, an older woman with a diagnosis of multiple myeloma revised her Will in 2007. Prior to surgery in 2008, she decided to revise her Will again. As part of the revisions, the testatrix decided to bequest all of her real property to just one of her five children (who had also taken the role of caregiver for her mother). Four days after signing the new Will (and three days after surgery), the decedent died. After the will was probated, the remaining four children sued their sister seeking an order that either their mother lacked the mental capacity to make the revised Will; or that the revised Will was made as a result of their sister’s undue influence.

The King George Circuit Court determined that the decedent lacked the testamentary capacity when she executed the Will and that the Will was the result of undue influence, but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed. In this blog post, we examine the direction given by the Virginia Supreme Court in determining whether a decedent had the mental capacity at the time the Will was made.

Continue reading “Estate Administration: Will Contests and Testamentary Capacity”

In litigation matters involving common interest communities (otherwise known as homeowners associations (“HOAs”) or condominium owners associations (“condo associations”)), the issue of awarding attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties ultimately arises. Generally, the HOA’s Governing Documents or the condo association’s Condominium Instruments contain such a provision. Otherwise, attorneys’ fees may be recoverable by statute for HOAs and condo associations.

These attorney fee-shifting provisions, either by contract or statute, are contrary to the typical “American Rule” cases in which each side pays their own attorneys’ fees. Because litigation has become so expensive to pursue, whether to award attorneys’ fees, and the amount of any award, has become separate litigation on its own at the conclusion of cases.

In the recent case of Dewberry & Davis, Inc. v. C3NS, Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court was faced with the issue of “whether the circuit court erred in applying an attorneys’ fees provision of a contract.” We had previously blogged about this case, because in the underlying contract between the parties, Dewberry & Davis, an engineering company, had limited its liability for damages. The trial court had determined the limitation of liability clause was void, pointing to a recent change to Virginia Code § 54.1-411that permitted an engineering company to include a limitation of liability clause. Because the contract predated the code change, the court determined that those changes “demonstrate that the General Assembly fully intended to alter the statute’s intent.”

The case continued to trial, and eventually, upon appeal, to the Virginia Supreme Court. This blog post explains that Supreme Court decision relating to the award of attorneys’ fees.

Continue reading “Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation – When fees get awarded to the “Prevailing Party””

We know that in Virginia, the parties to a contract are bound to the terms of that contract. We also know that Virginia courts look to the terms of that contract to determine each party’s rights and obligations. But what is a “contract?” This blog post looks at a recent Virginia Supreme Court case that gives a little guidance to answer that question.

Continue reading “When is a “Contract” not a Contract?”

Many times, parties enter into informal loan agreements on a simple oral promise to “pay it back.”  Similarly, others will enter into oral agreements to perform residential construction projects, or other types of projects. When things do not go as expected and the promises are of a value worth litigating over (or one of the parties to the promise thinks they are) things can go swiftly downhill.

Contracts

Continue reading “Oral Contracts are enforceable, but . . . .”

We have written on the issues that arise when employees use their work computer for personal business. In that blog article, we referred to a California case in which an appellate court ruled that an employee’s emails to her attorney were not protected by the attorney-client privilege because the company had a written policy that informed employees that computers were not to be used for personal matters, that emails could be monitored to ensure that employees complied with the policy, and that employees should not expect any privacy in the use of their computers.

In local news, former Delegate Phil Hamilton raised a “marital privilege” objection to the use at trial of emails he sent to his wife. Certain communications to and from a spouse can be protected from disclosure. There were complicating factors to this case’s analysis.

Continue reading “Emails from work computer can waive rights to privileged communications”

Simply stated, caveat emptor means “let the buyer take care,” or even more plainly stated: “Buyer beware.” In real estate matters, buyers are warned that they are to “exercise ordinary care in inspecting the condition of property.” Therefore, buyers are generally urged to obtain a home inspection and take such other care prior to closing on their real estate purchase. Otherwise, the buyers may not have any relief if they find adverse conditions after taking possession.

A case arising out of Charlottesville highlights the obligations of the buyers and the sellers in the purchase of a home. In that case, the seller of the home was also a licensed real estate agent, which added another complication regarding the duty to disclose. This blog posts analyzes that court decision, which offers warnings to buyers and sellers of real estate, as well as to licensed real estate agents.

Continue reading “The Rule of Caveat Emptor in the Sale of Real Estate vs. a Seller’s Duty to Disclose”

Introduction

As we have previously written, Virginia generally follows the “American Rule” in requests for an award of attorneys’ fees in litigation cases. Jurisdictions that follow the American Rule require each side to pay their own attorneys’ fees, unless a party can point to a statute or contract provision that allows fee-shifting.

In a recent unpublished order, the Virginia Supreme Court struck a contractual fee-shifting provision. This blog post reviews that decision.

Continue reading “Attorneys’ Fee Provision in a Contract is Rejected as “Unconscionable””