{"id":3028,"date":"2023-04-25T01:54:09","date_gmt":"2023-04-25T05:54:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/?p=3028"},"modified":"2023-04-25T01:54:09","modified_gmt":"2023-04-25T05:54:09","slug":"attorneys-fee-provision-in-a-contract-is-rejected-as-unconscionable","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/?p=3028","title":{"rendered":"Attorneys\u2019 Fee Provision in a Contract is Rejected as \u201cUnconscionable\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As we have <a href=\"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/?p=2197\">previously\nwritten<\/a>, Virginia generally follows the \u201c<a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/American_rule_(attorney's_fees)\">American\nRule<\/a>\u201d in requests for an award of attorneys\u2019 fees in litigation cases. Jurisdictions\nthat follow the American Rule require each side to pay their own attorneys\u2019\nfees, unless a party can point to a statute or contract provision that allows\nfee-shifting. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In a recent <a href=\"http:\/\/www.courts.state.va.us\/opinions\/home.html\">unpublished order<\/a>,\nthe Virginia Supreme Court struck a contractual fee-shifting provision. This\nblog post reviews that decision.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-gallery columns-1 is-cropped wp-block-gallery-1 is-layout-flex wp-block-gallery-is-layout-flex\"><li class=\"blocks-gallery-item\"><figure><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"297\" height=\"194\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Contract.png\" alt=\"\" data-id=\"3030\" data-link=\"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/?attachment_id=3030\" class=\"wp-image-3030\"\/><\/figure><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the case of <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.courts.state.va.us\/courts\/scv\/orders_unpublished\/181678.pdf\">Flint Hill School v. McIntosh<\/a><\/em>, parents of the school challenged the fee-shifting provision of their child\u2019s Enrollment Contract. That provision read as follows: &#8220;We (I) agree to pay all attorneys&#8217; fees and costs incurred by Flint Hill School in any action arising out of or relating to this Enrollment Contract.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Virginia Supreme Court stated in clear terms that this\nprovision was \u201cunconscionable\u201d as an \u201cadhesion contract.\u201d &nbsp;The Court dismissed the school&#8217;s position that\n\u201cany attorneys&#8217; fees will be limited by reasonableness\u201d because for the Court,\nthe underlying obligation for the parents \u201cto pay the School&#8217;s attorneys&#8217; fees .\n. . in any action arising out of or relating to the Enrollment Contract . . . &nbsp;creates an inequality so gross that it shocks\nthe conscience.\u201d Specifically, the Virginia Supreme Court stated that \u201cNo one\nwith his or her senses \u2018and not under delusion\u2019 would agree to this particular\nattorneys&#8217; fees provision because it is overly broad.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Therefore, it is important to review attorneys\u2019 fee\nprovisions in all manners of contracting. &nbsp;Generally speaking, contractual terms setting forth\nthat \u201cthe prevailing party\u201d in any action to enforce the contract address the\nVirginia Supreme Court\u2019s concern on \u201cinequality\u201d between the parties.\nObviously, each situation and each party\u2019s bargaining power could result in a\ndifferent outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The general rule in Virginia is that each side pays their\nown attorneys\u2019 fees in litigation unless the parties have a contractual\nfee-shifting provision or rely upon a statutory fee-shifting provision. This\ncase provides an opening for a party to challenge contractual terms if they\nmeet the Virginia Supreme Court\u2019s definition of \u201cunconscionable.\u201d It may be\ntime to review your attorneys\u2019 fee-shifting provisions with your <a href=\"http:\/\/tarleyrobinson.com\/?page_id=74\">business attorney<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In a recent unpublished order, the Virginia Supreme Court struck a contractual fee-shifting provision. This blog post reviews that decision.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[336,3,58,247,1,57,23,141],"tags":[404,11,175,405],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3028"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3028"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3028\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3033,"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3028\/revisions\/3033"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3028"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3028"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.tarleyrobinson.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3028"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}